The 1906 Algeciras conference took place from 16 January to 7 April in Algeciras, Spain. The aim of the conference was to find a solution to the first Moroccan crisis of 1905 between France and Germany, born when Germany responded to France`s efforts to establish a protectorate over the independent state of Morocco.  Germany did not try to stop the French expansion. Its objective was to strengthen its own international prestige, and it failed hard. The result was a much closer relationship between France and Great Britain, which strengthened the Cordial Agreement, with London and Paris Berlin becoming increasingly suspicious and wary.  An even more important consequence was the increased sense of frustration and will to war in Germany. It has spread beyond the political elite to much of the press and to most political parties, with the exception of the left-wing Liberals and Social Democrats. The pan-Canadian element grew stronger and denounced the withdrawal of their government as a betrayal and reinforced chauvinistic support for the war.  After the failure of its attempt to isolate Britain, Germany promoted in 1906 the growing Anglo-German marine race with the adoption of the third naval law. The total contribution to the outbreak of the First World War could then be the separation of Germany and its allies (Triple Alliance) and Great Britain, France and Russia, which were to become the Triple Agreement the following year. The next major event that condenses tensions between the two would be the Bosnian crisis.  The Anglo-French agreements recognized France`s priority interests in Morocco and Britain`s special place in Egypt.
They also secretly ensured the future division of Morocco between France and Spain. In 1905, the German Chancellor, Prince Bernard von Bolow, believed that Germany should demonstrate its status as a great power and its right to be heard on such matters. He encouraged the German Emperor William II to go to Tangier (March 1905) to assure the Sultan of German aid to Moroccan independence. French Prime Minister Théophile Delcassé resigned and Germany appeared to have achieved its goal of disrupting Franco-British relations. Nevertheless, von Bolow insisted on pushing his advantage and forced the convening of an international conference in Algeciras, Spain, to discuss France`s reform programme for Morocco. The conference was a disaster for the Germans. Their policy of threats had alienated governments and public opinion throughout Europe to the point that Germany was as far away as isolated, with only the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Morocco themselves on the German side. At first glance, Germany seemed to have achieved its objective, as the conference reaffirmed Morocco`s independence. But it also authorized French and Spanish control of Moroccan police and banks and paved the way for France to continue encroaching on Moroccan independence. The first Moroccan crisis fostered closer relations between France and Britain, revealing the weakness of Germany`s diplomatic position. By allowing the French penetration of Morocco, it has practically guaranteed the rise of the Moroccan nationalist opposition to the agreements. Such resistance has almost certainly led to new French interventions in Morocco`s purely formal independence.
The Algeciras law has been doomed to failure from the beginning and culminated in the Agadir crisis of 1911. The two main protagonists of Algeciras were France and Germany. But for Germany, it soon became clear that other European powers had sided with France – Britain, Spain and Italy had agreed beforehand on what would happen to Morocco.